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Abstract 
This is the author's opening statement at the Second Annual Seminar on New Development Finance. 
It contains three parts. The first part assesses dimensions of recent achievements in micro finance. It 
defines achievements in terms of six dimensions of outreach (quality, cost, depth, breadth, length, and 
variety) and of its relationships with sustainability. A rigorous definition of expansion of the frontier 
is also provided. The second part discusses the reasons for gaps among current achievements, 
potential supply, legitimate demand, and political expectations. A distinction is made between gains 
in technical efficiency and innovation, and the determinants of each type of improvement are 
examined. Threats from unwarranted political expectations are also identified. The third part 
discusses recent changes in the microfinance field due to systemic risk, increasing competition, 
improper regulation, and attempts of return by the state to development finance. This section 
evaluates threats emerging from these changes. 
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Microfinance: Broader Achievements and New Challenges1 
Claudio Gonzalez-Vega2 
In A Tale o/Two Cities, Charles Dickens described the epoch as: "It was the best of times, 
it was the worst of times." The two cities in the Dickens story were not, of course, Frankfurt, 
Germany and Columbus, Ohio, but the sentiment related by Dickens may be appropriate to describe 
the current state of micro finance. 
I 
Dimensions of Achievement 
This is the best of times for micro finance. 
In several countries, results in terms of micro finance outreach can be identified that represent 
achievements that are far beyond any ambitious outreach outcome that could have been imagined only 
fifteen years ago, and fifteen years is a very short span of time. Moreover, a few microfinance 
programs have made significant progress, not only in terms of outreach, but also in terms of 
sustainability (Y aron, 1994; Christen et al., 1995). Furthermore, the programs with the best outreach 
outcomes tend to be also the programs with the best sustainability achievements (Gonzalez-Vega et 
al., 1997). 
1 Opening statement at the Second Annual Seminar on New Development Finance, held at 
the Goethe University of Frankfurt on September 21-26, 1998. The style of the oral presentation is 
preserved. 
2 The author is Professor of Agricultural, Environmental, and Development Economics and 
Director of the Rural Finance Program at The Ohio State University. He would like to acknowledge 
support from the USAID Microenterprise Best Practices Project, Internationale Projekt Consult, and 
the Department of Agricultural, Environmental, and Development Economics at The Ohio State 
University for recent research in this field. Special thanks go to Pro£ Harry Schmidt at the University 
of Frankfurt, co-organizer of the Seminar, for fruitful joint efforts and for his hospitality, and to 
participants in the Seminar for their comments and enthusiasm. All views are the author's and not 
necessarily those of the sponsoring organizations. 
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A good microfinance program actually exhibits an attractive combination of: 
(a) quality of outreach, 
(b) cost of outreach, 
( c) depth of outreach, 
( d) breadth of outreach, 
( e) length of outreach, and 
(f) variety of outreach 
Quality of outreach refers to worth, to how valuable microfinance products are for particular 
clients (Navajas et al., 1998). Cost of outreach indicates how expensive these products are for the 
clients, once both interest and transaction costs are considered. Indeed, success results from the 
ability to supply microfinance products that meet actual demands (highly-valued products) at 
reasonable costs. At this Seminar, Harry Schmidt will discuss circumstances when high costs are 
simply too high. No supply at all, however, is the same as infinite cost. 
Depth of outreach tells us how valuable it is to extend the supply of microfinance products 
to a particular target group, not from the point of view of a given client, but from the point of view 
of society. The political consensus is that it is socially more valuable to expand the frontier of finance 
for the poor than it is to further expand the frontier of finance for the rich (Morduch, 1997; Gulli, 
1998). The poorer the client, therefore, the greater the depth of outreach. Experience tells us, in 
turn, that it is also more difficult to expand the frontier of finance for the poor. As a result, difficulty 
and depth of outreach go hand in hand. 
Breadth of outreach counts the numbers of clients of a given depth who are supplied with a 
microfinance product of a given quality (worth) and a given cost. Because only a small proportion 
of the target group have access to formal and semi-formal financial services, the more numerous the 
clients reached, the better. Due to economies of scale, over an important range breadth of outreach 
and sustainability go hand in hand. 
Length of outreach tells us for how long: will the target clients be reached with only one loan 
and nothing else or will they be reached on a permanent basis? The poor value permanency and 
reliability, and they are willing to pay for these attributes of financial contracts. Length matters a lot 
to them. Except under very exceptional circumstances, moreover, length of outreach requires 
sustainability. One reason is that donors are unreliable suitors; they do not pursue a given assistance 
fad for too long. Today, microfinance is the darling of donors; it may not be (it will not be) 
tomorrow. Another reason is that without the desire for sustainability, clients, staff, and managers 
of micro.finance organizations (MFOs) will not have sufficient incentives to make the right decisions 
(Gonzalez-Vega, 1994). 
Variety of outreach matters because credit is not the only microfinance product demanded by 
the target clientele (Adams, 1983; Seibel, 1985; Robinson, 1995). The biased focus on loans of the 
donors does not match the central role that savings and deposit facilities play in consumption 
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smoothing and in the risk-coping strategies of the poor and, thereby, on objectives such as food 
security and other survival mechanisms (Dunn, 1997; Zeller et al., 1997; Sharma, 1998). The biased 
focus on loans of the donors does not match the role that payments services (funds transfer) play in 
enhancing productivity and in allowing the poor to take advantage of productive opportunities 
(Gonzalez-Vega, 1998a). The poorer, the more far away, the more rural the target group, the more 
does greater access to full financial intennediation (both loans and deposits) matter. The poorer, the 
more far away, the more rural the target group, the less are the opportunities offered by access to 
financial intennediation available. 
Because all aspects of outreach matter: quality, variety, cost, depth, breadth, and length, 
debates that separate outreach from sustainability are wrong (misplaced). Because all aspects of 
outreach are tightly linked, a biased focus that promotes only one aspect of outreach will typically 
ignore potentially counterproductive effects on other dimensions of outreach. A comprehensive 
perspective would shed more light on trade-offs and complementarities among these dimensions of 
outreach than the current debate does (Rhyne, 1998). 
Progress in microfinance does allow improvements in one dimension of outreach without 
deterioration of another dimension. Thus, a trade-off of one dimension of outreach for another one 
may only reveal one's preferences. For example, reaching one person in the first decile may be more 
valuable to me than reaching two persons in the second decile of the income distribution. A trade-off 
of one dimension of outreach for another one is not, however, progress. Progress requires 
improvement at no extra cost. Progress would be, for example, being able to reach two poor 
households at the same cost needed to reach only one before. 
This is the best of times for microfinance. 
Several MFOs have made significant progress in various dimensions of outreach without 
having to sacrifice other dimensions of outreach. This is the true meaning of an expansion of the 
frontier (Von Pischke, 1991). Progress is not about trading-off one attribute of outreach for another 
one along a given, stagnant frontier; progress is about pushing the frontier outwards. Progress would 
be, for example, more breadth for the same depth of outreach, more length for the same breadth of 
outreach, and so on. Most of the time, as I suggested last year at the First Seminar, the movement 
outwards is not unifonn, it is not homothetic (Gonzalez-Vega, 1997a). Indeed, policies and 
incentives for innovation influence the speed of expansion along different margins of the frontier. In 
this sense, policy and program choices matter. 
This is the best of times for microfinance because several MFOs are pushing the frontier 
outwards. The success stories of these MFOs are being broadcast widely: from La Paz to Jakarta, 
from San Salvador to Kampala, from Sarajevo to Dacca. They are still only a few, but their 
achievements are important, are getting broader, and are a source of hope. 
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Gaps and Dangers 
This is the worst of times for microfinance. 
Worldwide, the distance between achievements and observed demand is long. Demand, 
however, should not be measured by counting the numbers of the poor. Contrary to some 
expectations, many poor household-firms do not demand loans. Frequently, they do not demand 
loans because they lack sufficiently profitable productive opportunities to generate repayment 
capacity. In these cases, they usually do not want to borrow, and they should not be burdened with 
debt they cannot repay. In these cases, lack of loans is not the binding constraint that limits the 
expansion of household income. Schools, clinics, roads, markets, and institutions would typically be 
more important than loans in contributing to their income and welfare. Attempts to expand credit 
supplies should not distract us from these essential tasks of development. 
Around the world, however, there are also many poor household-firms who have a legitimate 
demand for credit that is unsatisfied. In these cases, the mismatch comes, not from lack of demand, 
but from an utterly insufficient supply. For this reason, the slow growth of credit supply is a matter 
of public concern. Moreover, the demand for other financial services that do not need demonstration 
of creditworthiness, in particular deposit facilities and payments services, is not being met by supply 
either, especially in the rural areas of developing countries. 
This is the worst of times for microfinance. 
While a few leading MF Os have shown that expansion of the frontier of finance is possible, 
in general supply has been slow, and it may be inevitably slow in catching up with legitimate demands 
for financial services by marginal clienteles. As a result, substantial excess demands for financial 
services remain unsatisfied, even at very high costs of the funds. Politically, this gap was easier to 
accept when there were no examples of success; today, a new hope widens the gap between reality 
and expectations. 
This is the worst of times for micro finance because the distance between achievements and 
expectations is becoming abysmally long. Indeed, there are serious gaps between: 
(a) current achievements and potential supply, 
(b) potential supply and legitimate demand, and 
(c) legitimate demand and politically-correct expectations. 
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First, there is a long distance between present achievements and potential supply: the 
microfinance industry is not offering all the services that it could given present technologies and 
available resources. This is a consequence of technical inefficiency: input/output ratios are not 
favorable, given what we already know about best practices in microfinance. Too little output per 
unit of input reduces the actual supply of microfinance below potential supply. If too much input is 
required per unit of output, inefficiency keeps the supply of micro finance low. 
Reducing the gap between current achievements and potential supply is the most immediate 
challenge for microfinance. It is not an easy challenge to meet where regulatory frameworks 
constrain the degrees of freedom of MFOs that want to eliminate the gap. This is why the 
microfinance revolution did not happen before. For a long time, repressive regulation stunted 
innovation in microfinance. 
This is not an easy challenge to meet, either, if indiscriminate assistance from government and 
donors reduces the incentives of MFO managers to fight inefficiency. Moreover, this is not an easy 
challenge to meet if ownership and governance structures do not create incentives to even try. Many 
MF Os lack sufficient incentives to pursue efficiency. 
Many MF Os are inefficient because they do not face (or do not expect to face) a hard budget 
constraint. Moreover, even when an explicit budget rule exists, many MFOs are still inefficient. 
They are inefficient because: 
(a) they think in terms of target beneficiaries, not in terms of clients in competitive market niches; 
(b) they think in terms oflevels of subsidy (i.e., grant transfers), not in terms of the quality and 
cost to the clients of their products; 
( c) they think in terms of the speed of disbursement, not in terms of levels of operational costs; 
(d) they think only in terms of outreach, not in terms of both outreach and sustainability; and 
( e) they think in terms of some, not all of the dimensions of outreach. 
They think in this way because their goals are narrow, their aspirations are truncated, and 
their horizons are short. They can afford to think in this way because they are not using their own 
money. They think in this way because their own objectives matter more in the short term, but the 
interests of society should matter mostly in the long term (Adams, 1998; Von Pischke, 1998). In 
general, they are not concerned with efficiency because they lack the desire for permanency. The 
desire for sustainability matters much as a locus of incentives for efficiency. 
Reducing inefficiency is the most immediate challenge for microfinance. Everything else 
equal, more efficiency will shorten the distance between actual practice and best practice; it will 
shorten the distance between a complacent statu quo and the frontier, but it will not expand the 
frontier. Expanding the frontier requires more than greater technical efficiency; it requires innovation. 
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Second, there is a wide gap between potential supply and legitimate demand. 3 This gap 
reflects the formidable obstacles that must be overcome for a microfinance market to emerge and to 
expand. These obstacles are real, not imagined. They result from the intertemporal nature of 
financial contracts and from the accompanying uncertainty about the willingness and the ability of 
borrowers to repay loans. They also result from imperfections of the information available to evaluate 
probabilities of repayment and from the opportunistic behavior of borrowers (moral hazard), which 
changes the probability of repayment after the loans have been disbursed. Moreover they result from 
nonexistent or inadequate mechanisms for contract enforcement. 
Typically, the greater the depth of outreach, the more formidable these obstacles and the more 
difficult it is for the frontier to expand (Conning, 1998). The more-acute-than-usual obstacles faced 
in microfinance reflect information problems that emerge from: 
(a) heterogeneity about the idiosyncratic features of firm-households that matter more in 
microfinance than in corporate lending; 
(b) the absence of documented credit histories and of credit-rating mechanisms; 
( c) the absence of standardized information that could be interpreted at low costs: there are no 
audited financial statements and no project feasibility studies; and 
( d) the lack of separation of the firm and the household, combined with the fungibility of funds. 
Moreover, formidable contract enforcement problems emerge from: 
(a) lack of assets that would pass smoothly to the lender to pay off the loan in case default and, 
particularly, lack of liquid assets about which there is less asymmetric information; and. 
(b) because even when these assets are available, the resolution of contracts takes time and effort, 
given the absence of an adequate institutional infrastructure, and it may become prohibitively 
expensive. 
To further close the gap between potential supply and legitimate demand, i.e., to expand the 
frontier by shifting potential supply outwards, will require: 
3 This gap reflects two sets of circumstances. First, because of market failure, due to 
adverse selection and moral hazard, even if in equilibrium, financial markets may not clear. That is, 
any resulting degree of credit rationing implies that demand exceeds supply even at equilibrium 
interest rates (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981). Second, even if the market cleared, given the obstacles 
discussed here it might clear at very high interest rates, which would leave many attractive 
opportunities unexploited. In particular, some unexploited opportunities may have marginal rates of 
return higher than those of actual projects financed elsewhere in the economy. This credit constraints 
would prevent the exploitation of socially-valuable opportunities for income expansion which, 
thereby, generate unsatisfied legitimate demands for loans. 
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(a) additional innovation in lending and deposit-taking technologies: 
(b) additional formation of human capital for microfinance; 
( c) additional development of new organizational designs (new types of owners, new roles for 
donors, new ways of raising funds, new regulatory frameworks, new governance structures); 
and 
( d) additional public investment in the physical and institutional infrastructure required for the 
smooth, i.e., efficient and stable, performance of financial markets. 
Greater efficiency will not be enough to expand all dimensions of outreach; several of the 
forms of investment listed above will also be required to expand the frontier of microfinance. In all 
these cases, resources must be invested, and collecting the fruits of these investments will take time. 
Experimentation and learning take resources and time; the public goods needed to expand the frontier 
of microfinance will not be available overnight; investments in microfinance require long gestation 
periods before they bear their fruits. Thus, reality and the expectation of immediate results will 
inevitably clash. 
In sum, the first challenge of microfinance is to reduce inefficiency, to get actual practice 
closer to the best-practice frontier. The second challenge is to invest efficiently in pushing the frontier 
outwards. Even under the best of foreseeable circumstances, however, there will still be an excess 
of demand over supply at reasonable costs of borrowed funds and, as a result, socially-valuable 
(productive) efforts will not be undertaken because of credit constraints. Unfortunately, however, 
the frontier of microfinance cannot be expanded by decree, and subsidies cannot fill the gap 
(Gonzalez-Vega, 1993). Only the search for actual reductions in resource costs, which are passed 
on to the clients, can accomplish this. 
Third, there may even be a gap between legitimate demand and political expectations about 
microfinance. A clear example of this gap are the goals of the Microcredit Summit (RESULTS, 
1996). These expectations are based on wrong assumptions about the role of finance and on a 
disregard of the difficulties of expanding the frontier. Thus, usually: 
(a) no serious identification of demand has preceded the numbers of expected beneficiaries; 
(b) no serious acknowledgment of the obstacles faced and of the feasibility of permanently 
increasing supply have preceded the promises; and, 
( c) as in the old days, the assumption has been that all that is needed is the will and the funds to 
do it, ignoring that the special credit programs of the past failed precisely because they 
attempted to provide a political solution to what in essence is a technical problem. 
( d) The challenge is not to find a willing lender and endow it with sufficient loanable funds but, 
rather, to find a production function (a technology) that makes it possible to produce quality 
financial services at reasonable costs for the micro-client and in a profitable manner for the 
MFO (Gonzalez-Vega, 1997b). Successful implementation of the new technologies will only 
occur, in tum, if the structure of organizational incentives promotes sustainability. 
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This is the worst of times for microfinance because this gap between expectations and reality 
is a source, not just of hope, but of also impatience; and impatience leads to poor advice, poor advice 
leads to disbursement pressures, and disbursement pressures lead to too rapid portfolio growth, to 
lower standards of creditworthiness, to screening mistakes, to shallow monitoring, and to higher 
arrears. Unchecked arrears destroy the culture of repayment for all MFOs in the market. Rapid 
growth, superficial loan evaluations, and unresolved arrears do not lead to success; they lead to 
failure (Gonzalez-Vega, 1998b). 
In A Tale of Two Cities, Dickens described the epoch as: "It was the age of wisdom, it was 
the age of foolishness." Hopefully, promoters of microfinance will have the wisdom to learn the 
lessons from the experiences of development finance, and they will avoid the pitfalls of foolishly 
attempting to use finance as a panacea (Adams and Von Pischke, 1994). 
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III 
New Challenges 
Much has changed in the past fifteen years. Some of these changes represent new challenges 
for MF Os. In my view, at least four of these changes pose considerable threats to micro finance as 
it has developed: 
(a) systemic risks, 
(b) increasing competition, 
( c) improper regulation, and 
(d) the return of the state (inappropriate government intervention). 
Fifteen years ago, microfinance programs were isolated experiments, struggling to learn how 
to minimize some idiosyncratic risks of lending: attempting to understand the ability and to shape the 
willingness of individual borrowers to repay loans not guaranteed by fixed assets as collateral. Today, 
micro finance programs struggle to become significant components of formal financial systems and, 
with these systems, MFOs are more vulnerable to systemic risk. 
New challenges for microfinance may thus emerge from the increased worldwide volatility 
of financial systems (Perry and Lederman, 1998). Many MFOs may not be prepared to deal with this 
new source of risk (Holtmann, 1998; McGuire and Conroy, 1998). Some of the successful MFOs 
have shown, however, flexibility and resilience during the recent Asian crises (Ito, 1998; Patten, 1998; 
Reille and Gallmann, 1998; Yaron, 1998). For too long, nevertheless, microfinance has ignored the 
threats of systemic risk. 
Fifteen years ago, leading microfinance programs were virtual monopolies. Today, the more 
threatening competition to existing MFOs is not coming from informal moneylenders as in the past; 
it is coming from private commercial banks and other regulated financial intermediaries, i.e., from 
those commercial banks that had shown no interest whatsoever in lending to the target clientele 
(Marulanda, 1998). 
New challenges for microfinance may thus emerge from increasing competition and client 
demands resulting from: 
(a) the arrival of new actors, some of them operating on market terms, some of them not; 
(b) the saturation of the original (probably easier) market locations; and 
( c) challenges from the aging of portfolios and the maturing of client relationships, where 
established clients have begun to demand additional services, more difficult to supply. 
Fifteen years ago, microfinance was not regulated. Today, almost everybody has a regulatory 
itch, but not every regulation is appropriate. Repressive and inappropriate regulation may be worse 
than no regulation at all. 
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New challenges for microfinance thus emerge from inappropriate regulation due to: 
(a) regulatory technologies that are not a good match for the new lending technologies; and 
(b) attempts to use the regulatory framework to pursue objectives other than the avoidance of 
excessive risk (Chaves and Gonzalez-Vega, 1994). 
Fifteen years ago, governments had abandoned, in failure and in shame, the field of 
development finance. Today, governments are too eager to return to development finance by 
boarding the train of microfinance. 
New challenges for microfinance may thus emerge from a return of the state based on the 
wrong assumptions that: 
(a) the frontier ofmicrofinance can be expanded by decree (i.e., by government will); 
(b) lack of funds is the binding constraint to an expansion of sustainable microfinance; and 
( c) a system composed of many MF Os, most of which would probably be weak, is more 
politically correct than a system composed of a few, strong and sustainable, MFOs. 
This is the best of times for microfinance. Although they are only a few, several MFOs have 
shown that it is possible to offer services in a sustainable manner, even at a profit. This is the worst 
of times for microfinance. Formidable new challenges are threatening this recently acquired 
sustainability. These new challenges are, in part, the consequence of success. 
First, success, and particularly profits, attract entry into a particular market niche, and entry 
increases competition. Increased competition is always welcome, because competition spurs technical 
efficiency, competition spurs improvements in the quality of outreach and in the variety of services 
offered, competition spurs actions to reduce costs that, in turn, allow lower interest rates. This has 
clearly happened in Bolivia (Dorado, 1998). 
Increased competition encourages efficiency but it also increases risk, however, and it may 
force some MF Os out of the market. When exit is due to entry of better actors in the market, it is 
a healthy outcome. When exit is due to negative externalities generated by market actors willing to 
behave opportunistically, which increases systemic risk, there is a social loss (Chaves and Gonzalez-
Vega, 1996). Moreover, even when it is healthy, increased competition makes the already difficult 
tasks of MFOs even harder. When the client has too many options, it is more difficult to create a 
structure of incentives for repayment of loans without collateral. When the client has too many 
options, the monitoring of borrowers by overseeing the repayment record of the client becomes less 
reliable, because the client may use a loan from another lender to repay the loan from the MFO. To 
address the risks, MFOs may be forced to revise their policies about products offered and about 
market niches attacked. 
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Second, success also attracts new sponsors. The most important, but also the most 
dangerous of the new sponsors is the state itself. When politicians want to become the godfathers 
of any MFO that is already successful, the MFO is in grave danger. Most likely sustainability is not 
among the objectives of these latecomers, who are trying to board the train ofmicrofinance when it 
is already speeding. 
Moreover, politicians tend to promote MFOs that do not operate on market terms. This 
behavior generates another negative externality, as MF Os seeking sustainability find it hard to 
compete with subsidized and subsidizing MFOs. 
The new challenges are in part a consequence of changes in the environment. One of these 
changes is increased systemic risk. Systemic risk results from events that simultaneously hurt most 
of the clients of one intermediary or most of the financial intermediaries in a given sector. Examples 
of systemic risk are macroeconomic disequilibria, political instability, natural phenomena such as La 
Nina, or the deterioration of a country's terms of trade (Gavin and Hausmann, 1996). These events 
have a national impact; similar events may have regional or sectorial impacts (e.g., a flood, 
commercial reform, municipal regulation.) Stronger MFOs, with well-established financial links to 
pre-arranged lines of credit for liquidity emergencies and with a national outreach and broad sectorial 
scope for portfolio diversification, stand a better chance of surviving these systemic shocks 
(Gonzalez-Vega, 1997c). 
Particularly risky is a rapid expansion of the availability of loanable funds throughout the 
system: such a flood of funds may result from the excessive enthusiasm of government and donors. 
Access to credit that is too easy devalues the client relationships that are at the core of the incentives 
to repay of existing MFOs (Conning et al., 1998; Lavie, 1998). 
Similar damage to the culture of repayment needed for the successful operation of 
micro finance may result from the emergence, in the same market niche, of new lending technologies 
that have ample tolerance for arrears/default. Microfinance as it has developed requires a zero 
tolerance of default (Christen, 1998). In countries with mature financial systems, however, 
commercial banks and consumer financieras with a large tolerance for arrears may enter this market 
niche, and only highly competitive (best practice/best service) MFOs will survive. Earlier, I favored 
many experiments that would search for innovations in microfinance. Today, my recommendation 
is to tilt the balance of government and donor support in favor of the quality, not the number of 
organizations (Gonzalez-Vega, l 998b ). 
Another change in the environment is the prudential regulation and supervision of MFOs 
(Trigo, 1998). This is an important innovation, which adds to the institutional infrastructure needed 
to develop the microfinance market, but it is also a potential threat. As with competition, prudential 
regulation is generally a desirable feature of financial markets. If, however, the institutional 
framework is incomplete, competition and regulation pose new challenges that must be addressed. 
11 
Everybody wants to regulate MFOs, most of the time for the wrong reasons. Some 
regulatory frameworks want to force MFOs to work against the market, not with the market. Some 
MFOs may seek regulation only because it provides access to subsidized funds from a government 
apex organization (Navajas and Schriener, 1997). These are not good reasons to regulate. In 
general, government regulation is justified only for deposit-taking institutions and for very specific 
reasons that justify a departure from market regulation (Chaves and Gonzalez-Vega, 1996). 
If large numbers of not-deposit-taking MFOs are actually regulated, at worst, repressive 
regulation may slowly creep back into the industry; at best, costly, wasteful activities will be needed 
to regulate a multitude of small MFOs that do not mobilize deposits (Llanto, 1998). Even worse, 
regulation that is not enforceable or that is not enforced is always harmful, but most regulatory 
authorities do not have the resources and the skills needed to undertake this task effectively. Thus, 
prudential regulation and supervision are useful mostly for those strong deposit-taking MFOs that 
have become full financial intermediaries. Different forms of oversight, if any, may be desirable in all 
other cases to monitor the use of public funds, but this should not be confused with prudential 
regulation. 
The greatest recent threat to micro finance is the return of the state. Governments had left 
development finance when fiscal crises had made it impossible to continue funding the losses of 
special credit programs. Governments had left development finance when unhappy donors had 
refused to recapitalize and bail out bankrupt development banks. The failure of those interventions 
can be traced to a wrong choice of tools: credit is not a panacea, and cheap credit is the wrong tool 
to pursue most of the goals of the old programs (Gonzalez-Vega, 1994). In this sense, the train of 
the old development finance had square wheels: it could not go easily where government and donors 
wanted to take it. Government and donors, however, kept pushing this train with fiscal transfers and 
donor programs. The more they pushed, the quicker the wheels (being square and not round) broke. 
Eventually, too much pushing derailed the train. When this happened, a vacuum was created, 
and the children of regulatory avoidance, the NGOs that would become MFOs, began to build a new 
train. Because they were not regulated, the new MFOs could experiment a lot: there were no 
restrictions on what types of activities they could undertake. Because they were not regulated, the 
new MFOs were able to charge sufficiently high interest rates to begin to cover their costs. Because 
they were not regulated, the new MFOs could attempt to respond to client demand rather than to the 
planning priorities of governments. The microfinance revolution had erupted. 
Soon, the new train of microfinance began to take speed. Today, in several countries, it runs 
smoothly and briskly, conquering new territory and expanding frontiers. Because there are many and 
powerful new train operators, passenger safety may indeed require some prudential regulation. 
Governments, however, watch with envy the rapidly passing train: they want to board it, they want 
to add their name to it, they want to control it and to take it where it would serve their purposes. But 
government is a heavy passenger; uphill, it may slow down progress; downhill, it may accelerate 
derailment. 
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This is the most dangerous time for microfinance. The best MFOs may be able to survive 
systemic shocks, intense competition, and constraining prudential regulation and supervision, but the 
microfinance industry will not be able to survive the excessive enthusiasm and impatience of 
government and donors. 
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